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For 123 years, Missouri legislators, governors, judges, lawyers, and law
professors appear to have assumed that the state constitution requires a two-
thirds supermajority to override the governor's line-item veto.' In fact, nothing
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Briffault, Hank Chambers, Ken Dean, Jim Devine, Tracey George, Chris Guthrie, Steve
Ross, and Jim Westbrook, all of whom were very helpful. Responsibility for any errors
or omissions, of course, rests with the Author.
1. It is difficult to find direct statements to this effect, which I think is partly
reflective of how ingrained this mistaken legal assumption has become. Many legal
professionals undoubtedly believe it is unnecessary to state that line-item vetoes require
a two-thirds supermajority override because they mistakenly believe the rule to be self-
evident. Nevertheless, some examples can be found. The web site for the Missouri
House of Representatives contains an overview of the legislative process stating that a
line-item veto can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote in each chamber. See
Missouri House of Representatives, The Legislative Process in Missouri (visited Feb. 12,
1998) <http://www.house.state.mo.us/howbill.htm>. Also, newspapers generally report
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in the Missouri Constitution requires a supermajority override. This widely held
misconception likely stems from an unfortunate parallel to the governor's
general veto power where a two-thirds supermajority is required to override.2
This Article argues that the state constitution does not require a supermajority
to override the governor's line-item veto. Indeed, the text and history of
Missouri's line-item veto suggest a simple majority override. Moreover, simple
majority overrides are most consistent with the purposes of the line-item veto.
Thus, although Missouri legal materials provide a platform from which to
explore this issue, the Article's call for a simple majority override of a line-item
veto has relevance to the line-item veto generally, at both the state and federal
levels. Currently, simple majority overrides are the rule in five of the forty-four
states that give their executives line-item authority.3 The federal line-item veto
requires a two-thirds supermajority to override.4
Absent a line-item veto, the legislature may package bills as it deems
necessary for presentation to the executive.5 The legislature can assemble a bill
with many delicate compromises and give the executive the Hobson's choice of
accepting the compromises together or rejecting the entire package. The line-
item veto allows the executive to undo this packaging and veto isolated
provisi6ns, which may have the effect of destroying the delicate compromise
crafted in the legislature. Most every jurisdiction limits the line-item veto to
budgetary or appropriations bills, believing the goal of fiscal responsibility worth
the risk of executive aggrandizement.6 Nonetheless, the line-item veto
substantially enhances the executive's bargaining leverage with the legislature,
that the line-item veto requires a two-thirds override. See, e.g., Kim Bell, Veto Will Bring
Legislature Back, Carnahan Also OKs Teacher Pension Bill, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH,
June 1, 1995, at 2B; Chances Dim for Overrides, Lawmakers Gather in Jefferson City
for Annual Veto Session, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 16, 1992, at C2. Also, a leading
reference book on state government lists Missouri as requiring two-thirds override of
line-item vetoes. See 31 BOOK OF THE STATES 22-23 (1996-97).
2. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 32.
3. See 31 BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 22-23 (reporting that Alabama,
Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, and Tennessee require only a majority override of line-item
vetoes); see also infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
language in these five states).
4. The fedeial line-item veto contemplates that each vetoed item can become a
separate "disapproval bill" that becomes introduced in Congress as any other piece of
new legislation. See 2 U.S.C.A § 691d(c) (West Supp. 1997). This "disapproval bill"
is then subject to the regular presentment requirements for all federal legislation
contained in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, which provides that vetoed bills are subject to a two-
thirds supermajority override. See also infra note 33 (discussing federal line-item veto).
5. The requirement in many states that legislation contain no more than a single
subject operates somewhat to limit the legislature's abilities to package legislative
compromises in a single bill. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, § 23 ("No bill shall contain
more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title .....
6. See 31 BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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and there is no reason to believe that the executive will use this increased
bargaining leverage in ways that a majority of the body politic will consider
public regarding. For example, many critics have suggested President Clinton
has used his line-item authority for political ends rather than fiscal restraint
The dangers of tipping the balance of power to the executive are more than
academic. Consider the 1997 Missouri example of a threatened line-item veto
of language denying state funds to Planned Parenthood because it performs
abortions.8 In the end, the governor did not exercise the line-item veto out of
concerns that the state constitution might not allow the rejection of substantive
language in an appropriations measure.9 Nevertheless, the episode demonstrates
how the line-item veto can transfer law-making authority from a multimember,
popularly elected legislature to a single person serving as executive. Even if one
generally agreed with the outcomes the governor hoped to achieve by
threatening the veto (as the Author did), it was troubling to see the executive
branch wield its constitutional line-item authority to upset what surely was a
legislative compromise.
Later in the year, the governor's general veto of a bill banning partial-birth
abortions was sustained by the margin of only one vote in the Missouri General
Assembly,"0 suggesting that the governor may not have enjoyed majority
7. E.g., Paul Greenberg, Line-item Games Begin, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Aug.
24, 1997, at B4, available in 1997 WL 11967589; David C. King, Line Item Veto
Nothing Short of Political Extortion, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1997, at 41, available in
1997 WL 1305639; A Veto Is a Veto Is a Veto, ST. LoUis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 15, 1998,
at B2, available in 1998 WL 3320042.
8. See Jo Mannies, Planned Parenthood Threatens Suit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
May 24, 1997, at A12; Kevin Murphy, Missouri Budget May Be Headed for Legal
Showdown: At Issue Is Whether Planned Parenthood Funds Can Be Cut, KAN. CITY
STAR, May 24, 1997, at C3.
9. See Kim Bell, Planned Parenthood Out of Spending Bill: Carnahan Puts His
Hope in Federal Courts, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 27, 1997, at IA; Will Sentell,
Carnahan Reluctantly Signs Ban: Family-planning Measure Passed with Expectation
Courts Will Nullify It, KAN. CITY STAR, June 27, 1997, at Al; Nicole Ziegler, A Tough
Call: Planned Parenthood Funds Leave Carnahan in Bind, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
June 17, 1997, at 4B. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing
governor's power to line-item veto substantive language). The governor stated that he
did not veto the bill because a constitutional fight over the scope of the line-item veto
might tie up funding for Planned Parenthood, a funding ban he expected the federal
courts would nullify almost immediately. Effectively, the governor relied on the federal
courts to achieve the same result as would have occurred with a line-item veto. See Bell,
supra, at IA; Sentell, supra, at Al.
10. See Kim Bell & Virginia Young, Abortion Procedure Survives as Senate Backs
Carnahan: Missouri Senate One Vote Short in Attempt to Override Veto, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Sept. 11, 1997, at IA; Will Sentell, Senate Upholds Abortion Bill Veto:
Several Missouri Legislators Switch Sides; Tally Comes up Just One Short for Override,
KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 11, 1997, at Al.
19981
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legislative support on the related issue of denying funds to Planned Parenthood.
Without the line-item veto, the governor would have had to accept zero funding
for Planned Parenthood or veto the entire appropriations bill. With the line-item
veto and a mistaken assumption that a two-thirds supermajority would be
necessary to override the line-item veto, the executive gained the power to undo
the compromise that denied state funds to Planned Parenthood. Whether this is
a good result largely depends on one's opinions about the underlying issue of
abortion, but, in the long-run, society is better off if these decisions are made in
multimember legislatures and not in single-person executive offices.
In a close analysis of the executive's general veto power and the line-item
veto, any parallel between the two executive powers breaks down. In fact, the
general veto power and the line-item veto power serve separate purposes."
While the general veto power serves as a check on temporary majority factions,
the line-item veto power, as currently implemented, is aimed at fiscal
responsibility. 2 The line-item veto helps to ensure that majority legislative
support exists for individual items of appropriation that might otherwise be pork-
barrel gifts to narrow special interests. The word "veto" unfortunately masks
two quite separate concepts. It would be better to rename the line item veto "the
executive's call for majority support." The current conceptualization of the line-
item veto unnecessarily aggrandizes executive power at the expense of a
democratically elected legislature.
This Article will use Missouri's line-item veto to consider overrides of line-
item vetoes. Neither the text, history, nor purpose of Missouri's line-item veto
supports supermajority overrides. The Article will argue that the text and history
of the Missouri line-item veto are at least ambiguous and probably compel
simple majority overrides. Moreover, the Article will assess the reasons for a
line-item veto and conclude a majority override would be the better result not
only in Missouri but in all jurisdictions with a line-item veto. Thus, although the
Article will focus on Missouri, its message is germane for the line-item veto
generally at both the state and federal levels.
This Article's sole focus is on the legislative vote necessary to override a
line-item veto. The Article does not take a position on whether line-item vetoes
should exist at all. To the extent a line-item veto helps guard against fiscal
irresponsibility, it obviously is a good idea. Given the actual application of the
line-item veto, especially at the federal level, its fiscal benefits seem minimal. 3
11. Cf Maxwell L. Steams, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 390-94 (1992) (arguing constitutional history of general veto
is not informative for public debate on federal line-item veto).
12. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing differences between
general veto and line-item veto).
13. The president's use of the federal line-item veto resulted in 51 vetoed items
from two appropriations bills, a savings of $431 million or 0.2% of the total
appropriations in the two bills. See Letter of Oct. 16, 1997, from Sen. John
McCain to President Bill Clinton (visited Apr. 8, 1998) <http: //www.senate.gov
[Vol. 63
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The price of the line-item veto--namely, the political compromises between, and
within, the executive and legislative branches-seems very high. The wisdom
of a line-item veto generally is a subject beyond the scope of this Article, 4 and
the Article should not be interpreted as advocating the adoption of line-item veto
provisions. Rather, this Article argues that, where they exist, line-item vetoes
should be subject to override by a simple legislative majority.
Part II of the Article explores the history of Missouri's line-item veto. Part
II also reviews the arguments made by advocates of the line-item veto generally.
The history and text of the Missouri line-item veto are reviewed in Part III,
which concludes that neither support more than a majority override. Part Ill also
considers why majority override is a good idea not only in Missouri but in any
jurisdiction with a line-item veto. Part IV concludes the Article with some
observations about how majority overrides can be implemented.
II. BACKGROUND OF MISSOURI'S LINE-ITEM VETO
Like the governors of forty-three other states, 5 Missouri's governor has
authority to veto "items of appropriation" in any bill presented to him. 6 Within
this phrase are two limits on the governor's line-item authority. First, the veto's
subject must be an "item," a term that has been the subject of much litigation in
other states but has occupied the attention of few Missouri courts." Obviously,
an entire appropriations bill is not an "item," but where Missouri courts would
delineate the other extreme is not clear. The governor often uses the line-item
authority to reduce individual appropriations, instead of outright elimination of
appropriations, 8 a practice that never has been challenged in Missouri although
/-mccain/prezliv.htm>. Commentary about President Clinton's minimal use of the line-
item veto appears at Dan Coats, Line Item Veto Not a Threat to Congress, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 15, 1997, at A17, available in 1997 WL 3204531; Trimming Fat
from Budget Will Require Bold Strokes, ATLANTA J., Oct. 16, 1997, at A18, available in
1997 WL 3997144.
14. Examples of papers discussing the line-item veto generally, especially at the
federal level, include Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the
1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1605 (1997); Glen 0. Robinson, Public
Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV. 403 (1988); Steams, supra note
11.
15. See 31 BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 22-23.
16. See Mo. CONST. art IV, § 26.
17. See also Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1171, 1181-98 (1993) (explaining case law on definitional issues of what is an "item");
Daniel S. Strouse, The Structure of Appropriations Legislation and the Governor's Item
Veto Power: The Arizona Experience, 36 ARiZ. L. REv. 113, 146-52 (1994) (discussing
"item litigation" in Arizona).
18. Examples of the govemor's line-item veto practices can be found in the annual
session laws. Many of these are vetoes reducing appropriations instead of outright
vetoes. A few examples are Appropriations: Department of Social Services, 1996 Mo.
1998]
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it is open to question. 9 Following the law of most states, an "item" is essentially
a separate line in the appropriations bill. In the vast mine-run of cases, what
constitutes an "item" will be self-evident. The second limit is that the item
vetoed be an "appropriation," the authorization of the state to spend money. The
line-item veto authority generally does not allow the governor to reject
substantive provisions in an appropriations measure.2°
After the governor exercises the line-item veto, the appropriations bill
becomes law, but the items to which the governor objects do not take effect.21
Instead, the items are returned to the legislative chamber in which they
originated and are "reconsidered separately."' What it means for the items to
be "reconsidered separately" is the subject of this Article. Most have assumed
the phrase means that the items do not go into effect unless two-thirds of the
entire legislature vote to the contrary.' This Article demonstrates that the two-
thirds rule is a misunderstanding of the text, history, and purpose of the line-item
veto provision and that only a majority vote of the legislature is required to
override the governor's line-item veto.
Missouri first adopted the line-item veto in its 1875 constitution, and in
1877 Governor John S. Phelps first used it when he reduced a $70,000
appropriation for the St. Louis County asylum.2' A constitutional convention in
1922-23 recommended changes to, but not replacement of, the 1875 constitution.
Among these recommendations was a proposal that the line-item veto be
dropped in favor of a more direct gubernatorial role in the state budget process.'
Laws 119, 126 ($251,379 veto in appropriation); Appropriations: Department of Revenue
and the Department of Highways and Transportation, 1996 Mo. Laws 23, 24 ($15,655
veto in appropriation); Appropriations: Department of Agriculture, Department of
Conservation and Department of Natural Resources, 1993 Mo. Laws 57, 65 ($7000 veto
in appropriation).
19. Many state courts have allowed the governor only to exercise "negative" line-
item vetoes but not ones that operate "affirmatively." In practice, this means the
governor can use the line-item veto to completely negate sections but not to rewrite
sections and create new legislation. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1185-89; Strouse,
supra note 17, at 152-53. Some states have limited the ability of the governor to reduce
items of appropriation. Compare Karcher v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403 (N.J. 1984) (reduction
allowed) with Wood v. State Admin. Bd., 238 N.W. 16 (Mich. 1931) (no reduction). The
issue appears not to have arisen yet in Missouri.
20. See State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973) (governor may
not strike words of purpose in appropriations bill unless money appropriated therein is
vetoed). The Cason decision is the only reported decision regarding the scope of the
governor's line-item veto authority from the 1945 Missouri Constitution.
21. See MO. CONST. art. IV, § 26.
22. See MO. CONST. art. IV, § 26.
23. See supra note 1.
24. See ROBERT F. KARSCH, THE GOVERNMENT OF MISSOURI 109 (10th ed. 1968).
25. See MARTiN L. FAUST, MANUAL ON THE EXECTIlVE ARTICLE FOR THE MISSOURI
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1943, at 52 (1943) (manual prepared to instruct
[Vol. 63
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Missouri did not adopt this recommendation, and the line-item veto survived to
be carried over into the present 1945 constitution. The current version of the
line-item veto varies little from its 1875 progenitor.26 This Article later will
discuss more specifically the development of the line-item veto provision in the
state constitutional conventions.27
Presently, the line-item veto authority can be found in article IV of the
Missouri Constitution of 1945, amidst other provisions outlining and delimiting
the authority of Missouri's executive branch. Thus, in between provisions
creating the various executive offices and stating the governor's duties, one
learns that the governor also possesses a line-item veto. Specifically, the line-
item veto is found in that portion of article IV entitled "Revenue," a subpart that
establishes the Department of Revenue and details the governor's role in
developing the state budget.
The locus of the line-item veto is more than idle pedantry. The framers of
the Missouri Constitution saw the line-item veto as an executive function, part
of the governor's role in the state budgetary process. The general veto authority
is in article HI, among provisions setting forth the legislative process. This
organization was no accident. At the constitutional convention, both the
legislative-branch and executive-branch committees drafted substantially
identical line-item authority, but the convention chose the executive provision
as the most logical place to encompass that authority.2" That the line-item veto
is separate from the general veto authority becomes important to the thesis of this
Article, which argues that the line-item veto presents considerations distinctly
different from those presented by the governor's general veto authority. This
thesis is hard-wired into the very structure of the state constitution.
As noted above, Missouri joins forty-three other states that give their
governors a line-item veto authority. Missouri's provisions are typical. Most
every state limits the line-item veto to budgetary or appropriations matters.29
Ten states allow the governor to reduce an appropriations measure instead of
striking it altogether." Five states-Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Maine, and
Tennessee-provide that the legislature may override a line-item veto by a
simple majority vote.3"
delegates to the state constitutional convention and now available in the Missouri State
Archives); see also MARTIN L. FAUST, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN MISSOURI: THE
CONVENTION OF 1943-1944, at 2-3 (1971) (discussing 1922-1923 convention generally)
[hereinafter FAUST, CONSTITUTION MAKING].
26. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
29. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 22-23; Briffault, supra note 17, at
1175-78; see also infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing the veto
provisions of these five states in more detail).
30. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1176.
31. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 22-23; Briffault, supra note 17, at
1998]
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The state line-item veto provisions should be sharply contrasted with the
recently adopted federal line-item veto. State line-item vetoes can be found in
the various state constitutions, while the federal line-item veto is a creature of
statute.32 More to the point, the federal veto is a convoluted process in which
Congress can consider a single appropriation item three separate times. 33 It is
clear that under the federal line-item veto, a two-thirds congressional vote is
1176 n.18.
32. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 691-692 (West Supp. 1997).
33. After passage of a bill, the president has five days to convey to Congress a
special message disapproving particular items containing discretionary federal spending,
new direct spending, or a federal tax break. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West Supp. 1997).
The special message acts as a line-item veto, canceling the item to which the president
has objected. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West Supp. 1997). The president can exercise the
line-item veto only if he finds that it will reduce the federal budget deficit, not impair any
essential government function, and not harm the national interest. See 2 U.S.C.A. §
691(a) (West Supp. 1997). This means that the president's line-item veto authority does
not apply if the budget is balanced because in this case it will be impossible to reduce a
federal budget deficit.
Once the president has communicated his special message, any member of
Congress can introduce a disapproval bill that will receive expedited consideration if
introduction occurs shortly after the president's message. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West
Supp. 1997). The "disapproval bill" states only that Congress disapproves of the
president's line-item veto and reinstates the vetoed provision. The "disapproval bill"
then proceeds as any other federal legislation, through Congress if it can muster majority
support and then back to the president's desk. Having line-item vetoed the same
legislation once, the president presumably will do so again. The "disapproval bill" then
returns to Congress for an attempted override by a two-thirds supermajority. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
Supporters of the federal line-item veto lacked the political will or capital to get it
written into the federal Constitution. This convoluted process is the result. The idea is
to satisfy the presentment requirements of the federal Constitution. Whether this will be
successful is open to debate. A federal district court initially struck down the federal
line-item veto statute, a ruling that the Supreme Court threw out based on a lack of
standing for the congressional members who had brought the suit. See Byrd v. Raines,
956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C.), rev'don other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997). In the event
of a challenge to its constitutionality, the statute provides for a direct appeal from the
federal district court to the Supreme Court. See 2 U.S.C.A § 692 (West Supp. 1997).
Recently, a set of aggrieved private plaintiffs brought another suit challenging the federal
line item veto's constitutional and were again successful before the district court. See
City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1998). The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari, see Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 1123 (1998), and likely
will decide the case as this Article goes to press.
The unique background of the federal line-item veto renders it unilluminating to the
question of simple versus supermajority overrides. The convoluted federal procedure
does provide for supermajority overrides in the end, but that result was determined more
by the practical political reality of trying to draft a statutory line-item veto that could pass
constitutional muster than by the legal principles discussed in the text.
[Vol. 63
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necessary to override, but that result is mandated by the federal government's
statutory approach. Fearing they could not muster the political capital necessary
to amend the federal Constitution, supporters of the federal line-item veto had
to adopt a procedure to satisfy the presentment requirements of Article I, Section
7 of the federal Constitution.
L. INTERPRETATION
A. Text
The Missouri Constitution does not specify how the legislature is to
override a line-item veto. Indeed, to the extent the text says anything at all, it
appears to provide for a simple majority override.
Article IV, section 26 of the constitution authorizes the line-item veto:
The governor may object to one or more items or portions of items of
appropriation of money in any bill presented to him, while approving other
portions of the bill. On signing it he shall append to the bill a statement of the
items or portions of items to which he objects and such items or portions shall
not take effect. If the general assembly be in session he shall transmit to the
house in which the bill originated a copy of the statement, and the items or
portions objected to shall be reconsidered separately. If it be not in session
he shall transmit the bill within forty-five days to the office of the secretary
of state with his approval or reasons for disapproval. The governor shall not
reduce any appropriation for free public schools, or for the payment of
principal and interest on the public debt."
The text contains three relevant conditions, granting the governor the power to
"object" to "items of appropriation" which shall then "be reconsidered
separately" by the legislature. Other than directing the General Assembly to
reconsider separately any items to which the governor objects, the text does not
instruct the legislature how to override a line-item veto.
The section of the constitution providing procedures to override the
governor's veto generally also provides no guidance. Article III, section 32,
which sets out the general veto override procedure, does not apply on its face to
line-item vetoes:
Every bill presented to the governor and returned with his objections
shall stand as reconsidered in the house to which it is returned .... The
objections of the governor shall be entered upon the journal and the house
shall proceed to consider the question pending, which shall be in this form:
"Shall the bill pass, the objections of the governor thereto notwithstanding?"
The vote upon this question shall be taken by yeas and nays and if two-thirds
of the elected members of the house vote in the affirmative the presiding
34. Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 26 (emphasis added).
1998]
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officer shall certify that fact.... The bill thus certified ... shall become a
law.35
Thus, the general override provision applies to "bills," but the line-item veto
provision applies only to "items of appropriation." Because the general override
provision speaks only of "bills," it cannot govern the override of "items of
appropriation."
The distinction between "bills" and "items" is more than semantic. In the
line-item veto provision, the constitution carefully uses the language "items of
appropriation" because this language limits the governor's power to exercise a
line-item veto. "Items of appropriation" are given a constitutionally separate
status under the Missouri Constitution and the constitutions of other states. 6
Many lawyers and judges have spent many hours pondering what constitutes a
separate "item" subject to a line-item veto from non-"items" that may not be
vetoed separately from the bill.
Moreover, the general veto override frames the question for the general
assembly in a manner that makes little sense if it is to apply to line-item vetoes.
Specifically, the general veto override provision directs the general assembly to
consider: "Shall the bill pass, the objections of the governor thereto
notwithstanding?" '37 Again, the bill-item distinction suggests the provision does
not apply to line-item vetoes, but also the question's wording raises something
more fundamental. Under the line-item veto provision, the governor signs the
appropriations bill and then objects to particular items.3 8 Thus, the
appropriations bill becomes "law," and the constitution provides only that the
items of appropriations objected to "shall not take effect."39 After a line-item
veto, it makes little sense to ask whether the entire appropriations bill becomes
"law" because, by operation of the constitution, it already has.4°
After rejecting the general override provision as guidance, there is nowhere
else to turn. No other provision of the Missouri Constitution might provide a
procedure for overrides of a line-item veto. The only textual guidance is in the
line-item veto provision itself in which the constitution provides that "items of
appropriation" to which the governor objects shall be "reconsidered separately."
35. MO. CONST. art. III, § 32 (emphasis added).
36. See State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973) (governor may
not use line-item veto to strike out words of purpose in appropriations bill unless the
money appropriated is also vetoed). See generally Briffault, supra note 17, at 1181-98
(explaining approaches of various state courts to definition of an "item").
37. MO. CONST. art. III, § 32 (emphasis added).
38. See Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 26 ("such items or portions shall not take effect");
see also id. art I, § 31 ("If the bill be approved by the governor it shall become a law.").
39. Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 26.
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Standing by itself, the command that vetoed items shall be reconsidered
separately provides no real guidance. Without going beyond the text's words,
one could not fairly read a supermajority override procedure into the simple
command "reconsider separately." Based on the words "reconsider separately,"
what is the appropriate supermajority: two-thirds; three-fifths, as provided in five
state constitutions; 41 or perhaps another number? The words "reconsider
separately" are too empty a vessel to fill with a specific numerical supermajority.
The only textual anchor to provide any answer would be the general default rule
that, unless otherwise provided, legislation passes if approved by a simple
majority.42 Thus, staying within the four comers of the Missouri Constitution,
the text appears to provide only for simple majority overrides of line-item vetoes.
The textual issue becomes no clearer by reference to constitutional language
in the five states that currently use simple majority overrides for line-item vetoes.
In each of the five states, the state constitution expressly states that a simple
majority of the legislature is required to override a line-item veto. In four of
these states-Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee-simple majorities
are needed to override all gubernatorial vetoes, line-item or general.43 In Maine,
the constitution makes the distinction proposed here, with a two-thirds
supermajority override for general vetoes and a simple majority override for line-
item vetoes." Again, however, the Maine constitution is abundantly clear in
41. The constitutions of Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, and Ohio
expressly provide for a three-fifths override of line-item vetoes. See 31 BOOK OF THE
STATES, supra note 1, at 22-23.
42. See Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ 30, 31 (providing that no bill shall become a law
unless it is first "passed" by the house of representatives and the senate); see also HENRY
M. ROBERTS, ROBERTS' RULES OF ORDER REVISED FOR DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES, § 46,
at 191 (1915).
43. See ALA. CONST. art. V, § 126 ('The governor shall have power to approve or
disapprove any item or items of any appropriation bill . . . and the item or items
disapproved shall be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations
prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive veto .... "); ARK. CONST. art. VI,
§ 17 ('The Govemor shall have power to disapprove any item or items of any bill making
appropriation of money ... and the item or items of appropriations disapproved shall be
void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of
other bills over the executive veto."); KY. CONST. § 88 ('The Governor shall have the
power to disapprove any part or parts of appropriation bills embracing distinct items, and
the part or parts disapproved shall not become a law unless reconsidered and passed, as
in case of a bill."); TENN. CONST. art III, § 18 ("Any such items or parts of items so
disapproved or reduced shall be restored to the bill in the original amount and become
law ifrepassed by the General Assembly according to the rules and limitations prescribed
for the passage of other bills over the executive veto."); see also ALA. CONST. art. V, §
125 (prescribing simple majority override for general gubernatorial vetoes); ARK. CONST.
art VI, § 15 (same); KY. CONST. § 88 (same); TENN. CONST. art. III, § 18 (same).
44. In 1995, Maine voters added a line-item veto to their state constitution. In
relevant part, that provision states:
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requiring this result. The constitutions of these other states provide no
interpretive help for the Missouri situation because these constitutions simply do
not contain any similar textual ambiguity."
B. The Line-Item Veto in the State Constitutional Conventions
Delegates to the 1943-44 state constitutional convention drafted the current
Missouri Constitution." There were two delegates from each of the state's
thirty-four senatorial districts plus fifteen at large delegates.4" Any delegate had
the right to introduce a "proposal," a document analogous to a bill in a legislative
proceeding. The proposal was then referred to one of twenty-six standing
committees for review. Each committee issued a report to the full convention.
The reports contained the committee's specific recommendations for the new
constitution. If approved by the full convention, the Committee on Phraseology
received each committee's report and improved the wording of the report
without changing its substance. If the full convention approved the wording as
revised by the Committee on Phraseology, the report was sent back to the
The dollar amounts in an appropriation or allocation that have been
disapproved become law as revised by the Governor, unless passed over the
Governor's veto by the Legislature as the dollar amounts originally appeared
in the enacted bill as presented to the Governor; except that, notwithstanding
any other provision of this Constitution for dollar amounts vetoed pursuant
to this section, a majority of all the elected members in each House is
sufficient to override the veto, and each dollar amount vetoed must be voted
on separately to override the veto.
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1H, § 2-A (emphasis added).
The general veto provision clearly requires a two-thirds supermajority to override.
See id. § 2 (After a general veto, the bill is returned to the house in which it originated
and if "2/3 of that House shall agree to pass it, it shall be sent together with the
objections, to the other House, by which it shall be reconsidered, and, if approved by 2/3
of that House, it shall have the same effect as if it had been signed by the Governor.").
45. The previous two footnotes quote the constitutional texts from these other
states. In four of the states, each state constitution provides that the legislature may
override line-item vetoes according to the procedures for the override of general vetoes.
The state constitution then specifies that the general veto override procedure is a simple
majority. See supra note 43. In Maine, the line-item veto provision itself provides for
simple majority override. See supra note 44.
46. Many of the details about the 1943-1944 convention are necessarily omitted
from this short article. A general account of the workings of the 1943-1944 convention,
the politics that led up to it, and the ratification process can be found at FAUST, supra
note 25, passim.
47. The account of the procedures used at the 1943-1944 state constitutional
convention is taken from Missouri State Archives, Missouri Constitutional Convention
1943-1944, Preliminary Inventory (Dec. 1981). Further information is available at
FAUST, CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 25, at 12-23, 40-44.
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committee for engrossment and incorporation into the draft constitution. After
engrossment, the full convention then would vote a third time to approve the
report.
The Missouri State Archives hold the official and complete records of the
1943-44 and previous state constitutional conventions. Primarily, these records
consist of official committee reports, minutes and summaries of proceedings.
The state constitutional records provide outcomes but offer little insight into the
motives of convention participants. Nevertheless, the records do show the path
the line-item veto took through the constitutional convention.
Both the Committee on the Executive Department and the Committee on
State Finance s reported a line-item veto to the full constitutional convention. '4
The Committee on the Legislative Department did not include a line-item veto
in its report although it did draft the provision covering the governor's general
veto power.5° This division of labor emphasizes that the convention delegates
did not consider the line-item veto a legislative matter and conceptualized it as
distinct from the governor's general veto power.
When the reports reached the Committee on Phraseology, the committee
chose the line-item veto provision drafted by the Committee on State Finance.5!
There is no explanation in the convention records as to why the committee
preferred one version to the other. With the stroke of a pen, the Committee on
Phraseology's report crossed out manually the line-item veto provision of the
Committee on the Executive Department. At the bottom of the page is an
unsigned note, "This section transferred to Phraseology sections 3 and 5 of File
No. 14. " 2 File number 14 was the report of the Committee on State Finance.
The current line-item veto reflects the Committee on State Finance's wording
48. The full name of this committee was the Committee on Finance (except
Taxation)-Expenditures, Public Indebtedness and Restrictions Thereon. See FAUST,
CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 25, at 24.
49. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, 1943-1944
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MISSOURI (FILE NO. 16), § 11 (on file at Missouri State
Archives); REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON STATE FINANCE, 1943-1944 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF MISSOURI (FILE No. 14), § 5 (on file at Missouri State Archives).
50. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, 1943-1944
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MISSOUR (FILE NO. 17), § 34 (on file at Missouri State
Archives).
51. See REPORT OF COMMITrEE ON PHRASEOLOGY, ARRANGEMENT &ENGROSSMENT
1943-1944 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MISSOURI (FILE No. 16), § 11 (on file at
Missouri State Archives); REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON PHRASEOLOGY, ARRANGEMENT &
ENGROSSMENT, 1943-1944 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MISSOURI (FILE No. 14),
§ 5 (on file at Missouri State Archives).
52. See REPORT OF COMMrrEE ON PHRASEOLOGY, ARRANGEMENT & ENGROSSMENT
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with minor stylistic alterations by the Committee on Phraseology.53 Neither
version of the line-item veto contained specific language about override
procedures.
According to the convention procedures, the delegates, as a whole, would
have voted on the line-item veto provision three separate times. In floor debates,
delegates made only a few passing references to the line-item veto. None of
these references, however, explore the line-item veto in any detail and certainly
do not offer any insights into the override procedure anticipated for line-item
vetoes.
The convention records reveal that specific language authorizing a two-
thirds supermajority override might have been considered at the committee level
and rejected. A comprehensive proposal for the executive branch article
included a line-item veto that specified:
If any bill presented to the governor contain several items of
appropriations of money, he may object to one or more of such items while
approving of the other portion of the bill.... [T]he items objected to shall be
53. As it emerged from the Committee on Phraseology, the wording of the line-
item veto is identical to that in the present-day constitution. See REPORT OF COMMITTEE
ON PHRASEOLOGY, ARRANGEMENT & ENGROSSMENT, 1943-1944 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF MISSOURI (FILE No. 14), § 5 (on file at Missouri State Archives). The
version offered by the Committee on the Executive Department and rejected by the
Committee on Phraseology provide:
Not later than thirty days after the convening of the general assembly in
each biennial session, the governor shall submit a budget showing estimated
available revenues of the state for the ensuing biennium and recommending
a complete plan of expenditures. All recommended expenditures and
appropriations shall be itemized together with an explanation and
recommendations as to proposed legislation, if any, which he may deem
necessary to provide moneys and revenues sufficient to meet such proposed
expenditures. If any bill presented to the governor contain several items of
appropriation of money, he may object to one or more items or portions of
items while approving other portions of the bill. In such case, he shall append
to the bill, at the time of signing it, a statement of the items, or portions of
items, to which he objects, and the appropriations, or portions thereof,
objected to shall not take effect. If the general assembly be in session, he
shall transmit to the house in which the bill originated a copy of such
statement, and the items or portions thereof objected to shall be separately
reconsidered. If it be not in session, then he shall transmit the same within
forty-five days to the office of the secretary of state, with his approval or
reasons for disapproval. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as
authorizing the governor to reduce any appropriation for free public school
purposes, nor for the payment of principal and interest on the public debt.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, 1943-1944
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separately reconsidered. If on reconsideration one or more of such items be
approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each house, the same shall
be part of the law, nothwithstanding the objections of the governor.54
The proposal's directive that the item be "separately reconsidered" is merely a
syntactical switch of the current constitutional language that the item be
"reconsidered separately." Yet, in the proposal, the phrase "separately
reconsidered" did not include the concept of a supermajority override, or it
would not have been necessary to specify the two-thirds requirement. Also, the
proposal's line-item veto provision appeared just after its general veto provision,
and, despite the proximity, the proposal did not assume that the general veto
provision would apply.
The convention referred this proposal to the Committee on the Executive
Department."5 When that committee's report emerged, the phrase "separately
reconsidered" appeared in its line-item veto provision, but the language
specifying a supermajority override had disappeared. 6 One conclusion that
could be drawn is that the committee considered and rejected a supermajority
override of a line-item veto. Lacking records of the committee debates, the real
reason for the change in language cannot be known with certainty. At the least,
the history negates any argument that the convention delegates meant for the
phrase "separately reconsidered" to automatically incorporate the general veto
override procedures.
The 1943-44 delegates carried over the language for the item veto from the
1875 constitution. 7 The records of that earlier convention tell a story similar to
54. See Proposal No. 197, § 6 in Proposals: The 1943-1944 Constitutional
Convention of Missouri (available at the Missouri State Archives).
55. See REPORT OF THE COMM=ITEE ON THE ExECuTivE DEPARTMENT, 1943-1944
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MISSOURI (File No. 16), at 1 (reporting that Committee
on the Executive Department had considered Proposal No. 197 and other proposals and
offering a committee substitute) (on file at Missouri State Archives).
56. See supra note 53 (containing full text of line-item veto as reported by
Committee on the Executive Department).
57. The line-item veto in the 1875 constitution read:
If any bill presented to the Governor contains several items of
appropriation of money, he may object to one or more items while approving
other portions of the bill. In such case, he shall append to the bill, at the time
of signing it, a statement of the items to which he objects, and the
appropriations so objected to shall not take effect. If the General Assembly
be in session, he shall transmit to the house in which the bill originated a copy
of such statement, and the items objected to shall be separately reconsidered
MO. CONST. OF 1875, art. V, § 13.
A leading account of the 1943-1944 constitutional convention simply notes: "The
governor's item veto and his power to reduce items were retained." See FAUST,
CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 25, at 88. The remainder of the book makes no other
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that of the line-item veto proposal in the 1943-44 convention. An early draft of
the 1875 constitution contained a line-item veto with a specific requirement of
a two-thirds override.58 In this early draft, the line-item veto was coupled with
the general veto provision which also required a two-thirds override. Later in the
1875 convention, delegates separated the line-item veto into its own section and
removed the specific requirement of a supermajority override. 9 In its place was
the cryptic command that the line-item veto be "separately reconsidered." From
1875, through 1943, to the present, the question remains: What was meant by
"separately reconsidered?"
Drawing conclusions from the history of any deliberative body is tricky
business. We can no more pretend to know the intent of Missouri's
constitutional conventions than we can the present-day legislature. The
delegates to the constitutional convention cast their votes for many different
reasons, making the question of collective "intent" a problematic inquiry.
Indeed, it probably is certain that few of the delegates actually pondered the
specifics of the line-item veto. More to the point, because the 1944 voters of the
state of Missouri ratified the constitution, any historical inquiry would have to
include their state of mind as well, and it is likely that few of them considered
the line-item veto in casting their vote. Therefore, one must be careful not to
oversell the historical evidence.
Nonetheless, useful statements still can be made. There is evidence that
both the 1875 and 1943-44 constitutional conventions considered and rejected
specific language that would have required supermajority overrides. In its place,
the delegates left the ambiguous command that vetoed items be "reconsidered
separately." From this evidence, one inference is that the delegates intended
"reconsidered separately" to mean simple majority overrides. At the least,
however, the delegates certainly were not of one mind that "reconsidered
separately" necessarily included the supermajority procedures of the general
veto.
C. Purpose
The line-item veto's purpose is the most compelling reason to adopt simple
majority overrides. As discussed above, the constitution's text certainly does not
command more and indeed suggests a simple majority rule. History provides
some evidence to support a textual reading of simple majority overrides,
although history's lessons are not necessarily compelling. The structure of the
reference to the item veto.
58. See 2 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at
149 (Isidor Loeb & Floyd C. Shoemaker eds., 1932) [hereinafter DEBATES OF 1875]. The
executive branch proposal in the 1943-1944 convention, discussed earlier, was virtually
identical to this early draft of the 1875 constitution.
59. See 12 DEBATES OF 1875, supra note 58, at 367.
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line-item veto, however, tips the balance and completes the case for simple
majority overrides. To understand how the purpose of the line-item veto leads
to majority overrides, one. first must contrast the line-item veto with the
executive's general veto power.
The executive veto has British roots, originating with the power of the
monarch to disapprove legislation. In the colonies, royal governors exercised the
veto power to control local legislative bodies.' Given its roots, early federalists
were deeply suspicious of the executive veto. At the federal constitutional
convention, delegates rejected an absolute veto for the chief executive in favor
of a veto that could be overridden by a two-thirds vote in Congress.
6
James Madison defended the veto as a check on the temporary passions of
an elected legislature.62 Madison and his followers favored a republic dominated
by an elected legislature, but they also saw dangers in this governmental form.
Majorities could coalesce quickly around particular issues-"factions" in the
Madisonian vernacular-and oppress the minority. These majorities would
disappear quickly and others would appear in their place.63 The Madisonians
feared the federal legislature would quickly degenerate into a never-ending cycle
of wealth distribution and redistribution.
Modem public-choice theory has recast these Madisonian ideas and arrived
at the same conclusion. Public-choice theory conceptualizes legislation as a
package of costs and benefits that may be "purchased" in the legislature. On any
particular legislative issue, the most stable coalition is one more vote than is
necessary to win, typically one vote more than a simple majority." Because
members of the coalition should prefer to exclude unnecessary members and
capture the benefits of the legislation for themselves, any votes unnecessary to
success threaten to destabilize an otherwise winning coalition.6' This theory of
"minimum winning coalitions" does not defend legislative majorities as socially
positive but, like the Madisonians, sees them as possibly no more than a series
of wealth redistributions.
Whether the problem is conceptualized in Madisonian or public-choice
terms, the executive veto provides a partial solution. Because the executive veto
60. A review of the veto's historical development can be found at EDWARD C.
MASON, THE VETO POWER: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUNCTION IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1789-1889), at §§ 1-11 (1891).
61. See JACK N. RAKoVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, 256-58 (1996).
62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
63. A general outline of Madison's views can be found at Chapter III of RAKOVE,
supra note 61. Of course, Madison's classic statement on factions can be found at THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 and, to a lesser extent, at THE FEDERALIST No. 51.
64. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962); see
also Steams, supra note 11, at 408-09 (discussing Riker's theory of minimum winning
coalitions).
65. See RIKER, supra note 64, at 43-46.
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requires a supermajority override, it can help to assure more than minimum
winning coalitions. The executive veto works with the other legislative
chokepoints (e.g., committee chairs, procedural rules) to require strong support
of successful legislation. This, in turn, ensures that legislation reflects more than
temporary majority passions. Defended on these grounds, the supermajority
override for the general executive veto makes sense. A supermajority is a good
idea because, by definition, it is an indication of more than fleeting majority
support. Moreover, the threat of the general veto allows the executive to
participate and bargain in the legislative process. The actual exercise of the
general veto often is unnecessary because the mere possibility of its use causes
supermajority coalitions to form in the first instance.
The line-item veto shares a name with the general veto but little else. The
unfortunate similarity in terminology masks an important difference in the two
procedures. The line-item veto would be conceptualized better as a "call for
majority support."
In the forty-four states where it exists, and at the federal level, the line-item
veto is a tool of fiscal responsibility. Although some states permit other uses of
a line-item veto, it is aimed at appropriations bills where the executive is
expected to use the line-item veto to excise pork-barrel riders."' The legislature
is believed to lack the discipline otherwise necessary to make this occur. The
fear is that vote-trading or logrolling will occur between individual legislators,
leading to unnecessary and wasteful spending. In this view of the world,
legislators often vote for appropriations bills in a compromise with other
legislators. The legislators trade votes, pork for pork. The pork-barrel items find
their way into the appropriations bill not because a majority of the legislature
supports them on the merits but because a majority of the legislature is willing
to tolerate the pork as a compromise to obtain other benefits.
The line-item veto responds to these concerns by allowing the executive to
veto the offending items.67 Without a line-item veto, the legislature controls the
packaging of legislation." Compromise often occurs because legislators
package together legislation that appeals to different interests and vote for the
package as a whole. The legislature then presents the package to the executive,
who has the choice of accepting or rejecting the legislation in its entirety.
Essentially, the line-item veto allows the executive to unpackage the legislation
and to undo the legislative compromises that lie within.
The line-item veto's proponents argue that the executive's power to
unpackage legislation is especially needed for appropriations measures. The
66. In the 44 states with a line-item veto, it is limited to budgetary, appropriations,
and other fiscal matters. See 31 BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 6, at 22-23.
67. See Strouse, supra note 17, at 126.
68. In many state jurisdictions, rules requiring bills to embrace only a single
subject work with the line-item veto to prevent unnecessary riders. See, e.g., Mo. CONST.
art. III, § 23; see also Briffault, supra note 17, at 1177-79 (discussing how single-subject
rules work with line-item veto provisions to prevent logrolling).
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concerns are that a home district water project, buried in the back pages of a
lengthy bill, is enough to sway a legislator's vote in favor of an entire
appropriations measure. A $1 million water project here and a $1 million water
project there, and pretty soon some real money is involved.69 By exercising the
line-item veto, the executive is seen as encouraging fiscal restraint and striking
such wasteful spending. Even more than the actual exercise of the line-item
veto, the executive's threat of a line-item veto ensures that wasteful measures are
not placed in appropriations bills in the first instance.
Thus, in its classical conception, the line-item veto increases the executive's
power to interfere in the legislative bargaining process. It intrudes into the
traditional legislative prerogative to package legislation for presentation to the
executive. Whether this intrusion is worth its benefits is an empirical question.
Because a legislature represents diverse constituencies with widely varying
interests, bargaining and compromise must occur for legislation to emerge.
Although the executive's authority to approve legislation allows her to intrude
in the bargaining and compromise, the question is how much participation is
optimal. The legislative branch, with its numerous points for popular input, is
usually better situated to strike the bargain most appropriate to the affected
citizenry.
A supermajority override exacerbates the executive's opportunity for
legislative intrusion and unnecessarily aggrandizes the executive's power beyond
that necessary to achieve the item veto's purpose. A show of a simple majority
support demonstrates that a vetoed item can stand on its own. Although the
majority support might itself be the result of vote trading-i.e., "I'll vote for your
override, if you'll vote for mine"-this would be nothing more than normal
legislative compromise. The line-item veto should identify appropriations items
that could not get majority support even with this type of routine legislative
bargaining. For these reasons, the line-item veto can better be characterized as
"a call for majority support" from the legislature.
The Madisonian defense of the general veto also does not justify
supermajority overrides of line-item vetoes. It is likely that the Madisonian
fear-fleeting majority factions-can form around appropriations measures as
easily as other types of legislation. This fear however, can be addressed by the
executive's general power to veto an entire appropriations bill. Allowing the
executive to require supermajority support for each item of an appropriations bill
might better address the Madisonian fear, but it comes with a price. A line-item
veto gives the executive the ability to call for supermajority support but
increases the executive's already troublesome ability to interfere in the
legislative bargaining and packaging of bills. There is no reason to believe that
the executive branch will wield such increased bargaining leverage better than
69. "A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you're talking about real
money," is attributed to Senator Everett McKiney Dirksen in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS, 694 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
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the legislature. One person's pork is another person's social necessity. In other
words, there is no reason to expect the executive can make this distinction better
than the legislature.7" The inherent dangers undermine a Madisonian
justification for supermajority overrides of line-item vetoes.
Examining the purpose of the line-item veto makes a compelling case that
it ought to be subject to simple majority override. The text of the Missouri
Constitution suggests this result, which also is consistent with the text's history.
To the extent other jurisdictions adopt a line-item veto, they too should be
subject to simple majority overrides. Five states have explicit language
providing for simple majority overrides of line-item vetoes. In four of those
states, the legislature has the powei to override all gubernatorial vetoes by a
simple majority. The experience of Maine, the fifth state, is most instructive.
The Maine constitution explicitly provides for two-thirds override of general
vetoes and simple majority overrides of line-item vetoes.7 When Maine voters
adopted the line-item veto in 1995, popular debate included the concern that the
line-item veto enhanced gubernatorial power at the expense of the more
democratically responsive state legislature. The answer was that simple majority
override would allay the concerns of unnecessary executive power.72 Thus, in
a recent context, the popular debate seized on the intuition of the ideas expressed
here. The concerns of unnecessary aggrandizement of executive power are not
just abstract academic theory but the stuff of popular political debate.
IV. OBSERVATIONS
The better reading of Missouri law concludes that line-item vetoes are
subject to simple majority overrides. The constitutional text suggests this result
and certainly provides no procedure specifying a supernajority override.
70. See Devins, supra note 14, at 1619 (arguing against a federal line-item veto
because, inter alia, "[a]n energetic president, through the threatened use of his veto
power, may take advantage of high stakes omnibus legislation to enhance his bargaining
position.").
71. See ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. III, §§ 2, 2-A; see also Doug Kesseli, Line Item
Veto Gets OK, Mainers Protect Retirement Fund, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 10898438.
72. For example, one editorial writer defended the Maine proposal as "responsible"
and argued that the simple majority override "is an adequate check against the governor
gaining too much power through the veto." See Yes on Question 7, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10897938. Similarly, Maine Governor
Angus King cited the simple majority override as indicative of the line-item veto's
"moderate" approach and commented that, with the simple majority override, "[t]he
Governor can single out excessive spending and then throw it back to the legislature and
say, 'Are you sure you want to do this."' See John Hale, Mainers to Decide on Line-Item
Veto, King Sees Option as Tool to Stem Expenses, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 14, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 10896771.
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History is more ambiguous but is certainly consistent with simple majority
overrides. The records of the state constitutional conventions reveal that the
delegates did not assume the current constitutional language compelled
supermajority overrides. Combined with the line-item veto's purpose, the simple
majority result becomes compelling. Given the evidence, it is possible that this
result was commonly accepted in the Missouri legal culture at the time of the
line-item veto's 1875 adoption, and the rule has permutated with the passage of
time.
The supermajority rule certainly has become ingrained in modem Missouri
legal culture. Custom and practice are the strongest supports for continuing
supermajority overrides, but when text, history, and purpose point in the opposite
direction, custom and practice are a weak foundation upon which to base a legal
rule.
If Missouri is to adopt simple majority overrides, the most likely source will
be a court decision. A well-positioned and influential legislator could initiate an
attempt to override a line-item veto. If the override attempt gained majority
support, but less than two-thirds, a legislator or potential recipient of the vetoed
funds could bring suit to enforce the appropriation. The battle would play out
in the courts within the context of a charged political debate. The merits of the
simple versus supermajority debate would be inextricably tied to the underlying
dispute and likely lost in the shuffle. For example, the abortion debate swamped
a 1997 dispute over the governor's constitutional authority to line-item veto
substantive language in an appropriations bill that would have barred Planned
Parenthood from receiving state funds because it provided abortions.73
Regardless of whether simple majority overrides become the rule in
Missouri, it would be best if the debate did not play out within a particular
political context. Rather, state leaders should draft a constitutional amendment
with explicit language clarifying the line-item veto override procedure. The best
result would be an amendment authorizing simple majority overrides. The worst
result would be a continuation of the current legal fog.
An interesting question is how 123 years of Missouri history could pass
without the fog lifting. Although a complete answer is beyond the scope of this
Article, I suspect we have arrived at this situation partly because of the dearth of
formal legal training in state constitutional law lawyers receive. My observation
is not based on hard empirical data but on what I suspect is common experience
among many lawyers. In law school, federal constitutional law receives vast
amounts of attention, ranging from first-year courses in civil and criminal
procedure, through a survey course often called Constitutional Law, and to
upper-level electives in free speech and civil liberties. In contrast, state
constitutional law might get a passing reference, perhaps in an upper-level
elective.74 Continuing legal education courses seem rarely to cover state
73. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
74. Perhaps the trend is starting to change. For example, beginning with the class
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constitutional law. Perhaps this Article contains a hidden lesson for the legal
profession to take state constitutional law more seriously.
of 1999 the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law has reinstated a required
course in legislation. The course includes a review of legislative procedures and the state
constitutional provisions governing the legislative process. An elective course in state
constitutional law also will be offered. The Author's anecdotal evidence suggests other
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